My reaction to Yingling’s blast is actually here and might show some answers to some of the questions you posit. The bottom line as I see it: Yingling got a lot of attention, but aspects of the man’s argument got torn apart pretty thoroughly in a number of venues. I say that, by the way, as someone who would benefit careerwise from his prescriptions. There is a tradition of firing upward, but don’t be wrong…

The bigger question I put to folks is “why this guy’s article, and why the attention?” That string is pretty interesting to pull…

There have been several who have criticized the military while in uniform; let’s remember that great Army General, Billy Mitchell (the US Air Force did not then exist) who refused to throw the test results of aircraft sinking a battleship, as as a result was courts-martialed.

H.R. McMaster has not been particularly shy or withdrawn in his commentary, either (Derilection of Duty).

At issue, then, is comportment and deportment; one can utterly disagree with a superior’s decision, yet how one acts will be the test of professionalism (and military law). Does one say, “Yes, sir,” in a restrained and relatively smotionless manner, or does one sneer the word “sir” derisively?

In a written context, inflection is lost and therefore left to the reader. In today’s environment, with the press so liberal, I cannot imagine anyone taking action against him, on a practical level.

“SHOULD THEY” is another matter. I’d have to read the article in depth before commenting at that level.

Thanks for the thoughtful input, though.

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency.

Well? Now what do we think?

Rhetorically he starts to lose me when
he quotes Clausewitz at the beginning of the piece as if he’s authoritative and dispositive, then later in the body of the article he dismisses Harry Summers’ masterpiece “On Strategy” –which applies Clauswitzian analysis to the Vietnam War– with barely a sentence.

The thrust of his piece is that our General Officer’s shortcomings are mostly due to a lack of Congressional oversight. More Pelosi and Reid will fix us right up, you
betcha–to quote a great American.

He also says:

‘An understanding of the larger aspects of war is essential to great generalship. However, a survey
of Army three- and four-star generals shows that only 25 percent hold advanced degrees from
civilian institutions in the social sciences or humanities.”

No comment.

But most problematic is this:

“To improve the creative intelligence of our generals, Congress must change the officer promotion system in ways that reward adaptation and intellectual achievement. Congress should require the armed services to implement 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers. Junior
officers and noncommissioned officers are often the first to adapt because they bear the brunt of failed tactics most directly. They are also less wed to organizational norms and less influenced by organizational taboos. Junior leaders have valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of their
leaders, but the current promotion system excludes these judgments. Incorporating subordinate and peer reviews into promotion decisions for senior leaders would produce officers more willing to adapt to changing circumstances, and less likely to conform to outmoded practices.”

Mebbe so, but being beholden to peers and subordinates for promotion leads to the same thing. Unless you think being able to order men to their death whose approval you need to be promoted won’t quell initiative and boldness of action.

He concludes thus:

“The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not act, our Jena awaits us.”

The entire essay is a cop out and waste of time, if you ask me.

Happy Veteran’s Day.

But I’m left with this question: why repost this on Veteran’s day? A poke in the eye we don’t need, Ron.

Therefore I’m going to ask these questions in relation to the fact that this kind of thing has happened in history before, and in fact has happened on more than one occasion in American history, notably during the execution of the American Revolution, and the prosecution of Civil War.

I have my own opinions, theories, and ideas about how these various problems and questions could be addressed, but the situation, not just the current ones of our present two theatres of active campaigning, but more generally [pun-intended] speaking is a complicated one which yields no easy answers. Not least of all because a new policy about how to address defects in our current system would likely yield new defects of a different (if not unforeseen) kind even while correcting or at least addressing the present defects. Then again that’s life, ain’t it? You try to minimize liabilities and maximize assets and gains and if you are realistic and truthful then you just recognize that no benefit ever comes free of cost, and no cost ever yields perfect benefit. That kinda thing just doesn’t happen in this world. There is no perfect solution, and no risk-free scenario, despite the current political and social atmosphere of really, really, really “wishing it so.” That all being said here are some questions to consider in this respect.

Can the operational and strategic aims and capabilities of the military, even in regards to policy and doctrine, be improved by an act or acts of public political and/or social criticism?

Can the Chain of Command be improved by an act or acts of internal and yet public criticism?

Can military doctrine be improved by an act or acts of public criticism?

Does it show disloyalty to criticize the military, either from within or without, or does it show real loyalty and zealous interest?

How do we discriminate between acts of genuine and valuable criticism and acts of self-serving aggrandizement?

What mechanisms should be available for public criticism of the military, either among the civilian leadership, within the chain of command itself, or even among the citizenry at large?

How closely should one analyze the motivations of critics?

What level of expertise, if any, should be considered necessary before criticisms of the military are considered either potentially valuable, or probably valid?

When and in what form should such public criticisms occur?

Should such public criticism ever occur, and if so, who should produce them?

And so forth and so on…

Anyways, these are not easy questions to answer. Especially in a free society, composed of so many competing and conflicting interests, many of those interests being equally valid though not necessarily equally justifiable.

If such questions were easily answered they would have been resolved long ago by the Romans, or even our own ancestors, among others, and we could have simply adopted and adapted their techniques. But they weren’t, because for some things there is no easy firing solution, because there are occasions when you’re not really sure of exactly what your target is, or even what you should shoot at it. So sometimes you just have to keep shooting til you hit something, and pray you hit the right thing in the right way at the right time.

I reckon it will go no easier on us, no matter what we decide.
Or what we hit, or what we never hit.

In any case,

HAPPY VETERANS DAY

That picture includes interactions between the civilian authorities from President Bush on down and our armed forces, and those between these authorities and the Iraqi government. If Yingling was missing key information, as one would expect in view of his rank, his analysis could be way off base.

Field-grade officers ahve been writing letters critical of their General officers since Washington was in charge. Lincoln probably had the worst experience with it, but other presidents have suffered through similar “letters to the Editor” for all of our history.

What has changed is that our media have annointed themselves as saviours of the nation, and are pressing an agenda to reflect their own views as to what America should be, and should become. Where Lincoln had a few Copperheads to deal with, nowadays they not only own the presses, they also run the Congress.

This letter is only a complaint on it’s surface. It’s actually a resume for post-service employment. The writer has made a decision as to which way the political winds are blowing, and is tacking his vessel accordingly.

As to giving the Congress-critters a say over General Oficer advancement(s), well, that’s a recipe for disaster, as each one will then be tailoring his views not with regard to the needs of the Nation, but with a view to the political views of those in power.

Respects,